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I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in
1987, sentencing courts routinely considered an offender's background
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and personal characteristics when imposing a sentence.' Today, how-
ever, judges strain to exercise their discretion in a sentencing structure
that focuses primarily on the offense committed and discourages con-
sideration of a defendant's personal history.2 Although judicial depar-
tures from the formal sentencing structure are permissible in certain
circumstances, 3 discretionary departures based on a defendant's back-
ground and personal characteristics consistently have met opposition by
the United States Sentencing Commission. This opposition has led to
the Commission's adoption of more restrictive policies governing the
relevance of offender characteristics in federal sentencing.4 Despite
these policies, however, district and circuit judges continue to find ways
to circumvent the guidelines in cases warranting special consideration.'
On October 6, 1992, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Roe'
vacated and remanded a district court ruling that refused to grant a
downward departure7 from the sentencing guidelines to a defendant
with a shocking history of family violence-an offender characteristic
that the Commission has not addressed specifically.8 Although other
circuits have held that childhood abuse of the defendant may be rele-
vant in certain circumstances, 9 the Ninth Circuit in Roe was the first to
recommend a departure based solely on a finding of extraordinary
abuse.
Fourteen months prior to Roe, the Ninth Circuit in United States
v. Floyd ° affirmed a downward departure on related grounds: the de-
fendant's "youthful lack of guidance."" In response to Floyd, the Com-
mission amended the sentencing guidelines in 1992 to reflect its policy
that "lack of guidance as a youth" and other circumstances related to a
1. See Bruce M. Selya and Matthew R. Kipp, An Examination of Emerging Departure Ju-
risprudence Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 1 (1991) (noting
that "[flor most of this century .... federal district judges enjoyed nearly unfettered discretion").
2. See id. at 10 (stating that the main focus of sentencing under the guidelines is on the
charged offense and the criminal history category of the defendant).
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988 & Supp. 1991) and text accompanying notes 48-54.
4. See Daniel J. Freed and Marc Miller, Departures Visible and Invisible: Perpetuating Va-
riation in Federal Sentences, 5 Fed. Sent. Rptr. 3, 9 (1992).
5. See notes 62, 167-69, and accompanying text.
6. 976 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1992).
7. This Note uses the term "downward departure" to refer to a decrease in sentence length.
8. Roe, 976 F.2d at 1217, 1219.
9. See United States v. Vela, 927 F.2d 197, 199 (5th Cir. 1991) (acknowledging that child-
hood abuse may serve as possible grounds for departure in extraordinary circumstances); United
States v. Desormeaux, 952 F.2d 182, 185 (8th Cir. 1991) (conceding that spousal abuse may be a
potential ground for departure in extreme cases). See also notes 137-51 and accompanying text for
a discussion of these cases.
10. 945 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on different grounds by United States v. Atkin-
son, 990 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1993).
11. Id. at 1102-03. See also notes 94, 95, 161, and accompanying text.
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"disadvantaged upbringing" are not relevant considerations for depar-
ture from the guidelines. 12 Although the Commission's action is consis-
tent with its tradition of squelching judicial discretionary departures
based on offender characteristics, the potential scope of this amend-
ment is troublesome. Did the Commission intend to encompass child-
hood abuse within the vague contours of a "disadvantaged upbringing,"
thus making it an inappropriate ground for departure? Or does the ab-
sence of more specific language show a reluctance on the part of the
Commission to bar such considerations?
Part II of this Recent Development examines the history of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and sets out the statutory provisions of
the Sentencing Reform Act and the guidelines that deal with offender
characteristics. Part III focuses on the different types of departures
from the sentencing guidelines, appellate review of departures, and ju-
dicial restraints on sentencing courts. Part IV addresses the significance
of policy statements and the Commission's use of them as tools for nar-
rowing judicial discretion. Part V analyzes Roe and other abuse cases in
light of the 1992 amendment, examines the history and construction of
the amendment, and addresses the implications of the amendment's
classification as a policy statement. Part VI explores the issue of
whether a defendant's history of abuse should be precluded from con-
sideration in federal sentencing and concludes that the judicial discre-
tion to weigh the mental and emotional effects of abuse must be
preserved. Finally, this Recent Development recommends adoption of
the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit in Roe, which preserves a
court's ability to depart from the sentencing guidelines in extreme cases
of abuse if that court finds the abuse caused a reduction of mental or
emotional capacity.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Reforming the Federal System
In 1984, Congress responded to the criminal justice system's dissat-
isfaction with indeterminate sentencing by passing the Sentencing Re-
form Act 13 (the "Act"). Indeterminate sentencing, which prevailed in
the federal courts for most of the last century,'4 allowed judges to sen-
12. See United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 5H1.12, p.s. (West, 1992) ("U.S.S.G.").
13. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was enacted as Chapter II of the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987 (1984), codified at 18 U.S.C
§§ 3551-3586, 3621-3625, 3742 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988).
14. See Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Lim-
its on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 Yale L. J. 1681, 1685 (1992).
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tence within wide ranges using individualized approaches for adjusting
sentences upward or downward. 15 This practice created uncertainty and
unwarranted disparity in criminal sentencing.16 Reports show, for ex-
ample, that under the pre-guidelines system, an African American de-
fendant convicted of robbery in the southern United States was likely
to receive a substantially longer sentence than an African American de-
fendant who committed the same crime in another region.17 Apart from
race, inequalities in sentencing also appeared to stem from judges' un-
justified considerations of the offender's sex and socioeconomic class.1 8
To tackle these problems, the Act created the United States Sentencing
Commission, a self-governing administrative agency in the judicial
branch composed of seven voting members, three of whom are federal
judges. 9 The Commission's main task was to construct a framework of
sentencing guidelines, based on categories of criminal behavior and of-
fender characteristics, that would provide courts with appropriate sen-
tencing ranges for all crimes.20
The original guidelines became effective on November 1, 1987 amid
hopes that a new, structured system would significantly reduce the
problems prevalent in the former system.2 In recent years, however,
this hope has given way to frustration for federal district court judges
who complain that the new system overly restricts their discretion in
sentencing. Lower court judges further complain that the courts of ap-
peals increase their burden with overly strict guideline
interpretations.
22
A source of frustration for district and circuit court judges has been
the Commission's failure to resolve questions surrounding the relevance
of a defendant's history and background characteristics to sentencing
decisions.23 The root of the confusion is Congress's inconsistent treat-
ment of offender characteristics within the statutory provisions of the
Sentencing Reform Act.2 4
15. See id. at 1687-88.
16. See id. at 1687-89.
17. Selya and Kipp, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 4 (cited in note 1) (quoting Hearings on
Sentencing Guidelines before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 554, 676-77 (1987) (testimony of Commissioner Ilene H. Nagel)).
18. Selya and Kipp, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 4 (cited in note 1).
19. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act § 217, 98 Stat. at 2017-34.
20. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)-(n) (Supp. 1992) (setting forth the Commission's statutory in-
structions for developing the guidelines).
21. See generally Theresa Walker Karle and Thomas Sager, Are the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines Meeting Congressional Goals?: An Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 40 Emory L. J.
393, 394 (1991).
22. See Freed, 101 Yale L. J. at 1686 (cited in note 14).
23. Id. at 1715-18.
24. See text accompanying notes 25-33 for a discussion of these provisions.
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B. The Congressional Approach to Offender Characteristics Under
the Sentencing Reform Act
In Title 18 Section 3553(a) of the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress
instructs the sentencing court to consider the following factors in deter-
mining an appropriate sentence: (1) the circumstances and nature of
the crime, and the defendant's history and characteristics; (2) the need
for sentencing in general; (3) the types of available sentences; (4) the
guideline sentencing range for the particular offense category; (5) appli-
cable policy statements; (6) the overall need to eliminate disparity in
sentencing; and (7) the victim's need for restitution.25 Additionally, Sec-
tion 3553(b) authorizes courts to depart from the sentencing range im-
posed by the guidelines if an "aggravating or mitigating circumstance"
is present that, because of its nature or degree of severity, was not ade-
quately considered by the Commission in formulating the guidelines. 6
Section 3661 of the same title reinforces Section 3553(a) by declaring
that Congress shall impose no limits on the receipt and consideration of
information about a defendant's character or background for purposes
of sentencing.
2 7
In contrast to the nonrestrictive provisions of Title 18, Congress's
directives to the Commission in Title 28 indicate that the Commission,
not the sentencing court, is to determine the relevance of offender char-
acteristics. Section 994(d) asks the Commission to consider eleven of-
fense characteristics and ultimately to determine their relevance to a
sentencing determination.28 These characteristics include eight back-
ground factors: education, age, vocational skills, physical condition,
mental and emotional condition, previous employment record, commu-
nity ties, and family ties and responsibilities. 29 Also, Section 994(d) lists
three factors that pertain to the defendant's criminality: role in the of-
fense, extent of reliance upon crime for a livelihood, and criminal rec-
ord.30 Section 994(e), however, admonishes the Commission to ensure
that its policy statements and guidelines reflect the "general inappro-
priateness" of considering some of the above personal characteristics of
the defendant in prison sentencing, including the defendant's commu-
nity ties, family ties and responsibilities, employment history, voca-
tional skills, and educational history.3 1
25. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (cited in note 13).
26. Id. § 3553(b).
27. Id. § 3661.
28. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (cited in note 20).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. § 994(e).
1993] 1337
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The restrictive language in Title 28 largely nullifies the Title 18
provisions that advocate virtually unrestricted consideration of offender
characteristics in sentencing.3 2 These conflicting provisions have created
confusion in the federal court system over the proper treatment of of-
fender characteristics in sentencing, confusion that later was com-
pounded by the Sentencing Commission's incorporation of similar
inconsistencies into the Guidelines Manual.
33
C. The Guidelines' Approach to Offender Characteristics
Guideline 1B1.4 currently reflects the mandate of Title 18 Sections
3553(a) and 3661: in determining sentences, the sentencing court is free
to consider "without limitation" all of a defendant's background char-
acteristics, conduct, and character, subject to other prohibitions by
law.34 This guideline applies essentially the same freedoms of considera-
tion to departure decisions.3 " The commentary to Guideline 1B1.4, how-
ever, calls the courts' attention to policy statements that reflect the
Commission's view that some factors are inappropriate considerations
for departures, sentencing, or both.'
In other sections, the guidelines set forth the Commission's ulti-
mate determination, made pursuant to Congress's instructions in Sec-
tion 994, that only the three criminal characteristics of the defendant
(role in the offense, extent of reliance upon crime for a livelihood, and
criminal record) are relevant in determining an appropriate sentence.
3 7
By contrast, policy statements in Section 5H classify the eight personal
characteristics of the defendant as either "not relevant" or "not ordina-
rily relevant" to a decision to depart from the appropriate guideline
range.3 8 The introductory commentary to Part H of Chapter 5, however,
notes that, unless stated otherwise, factors not relevant to a departure
decision may be appropriate considerations for determining sentences
32. See notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
33. See Freed, 101 Yale L. J. at 1716-18 (cited in note 14). See also notes 34-42 and accompa-
nying text.
34. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4 at 24 (cited in note 12). Professor Freed suggests that the words "unless
otherwise prohibited by law" refer to the final sentence in 28 U.S.C. § 994(d): "The Commission
shall assure that the guidelines and policy statements are entirely neutral as to the race, sex, na-
tional origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of the offenders." Freed, 101 Yale L. J. at 1717 n.181
(cited in note 14). The guidelines, however, do not provide authority for this statement.
35. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4 at 24-25.
36. Id., comment. at 25.
37. Id. §§ 3B1.1-.2 at 243-45 (addressing role in the offense), §§ 4B1.1-.4 at 281-85 (address-
ing criminal livelihood), and §§ 4A1.1-.3 at 269-79 (addressing criminal history). See also Freed,
101 Yale L. J. at 1717 n.183 (cited in note 14).
38. U.S.S.G. §§ 5H1.1-.6 at 323-35. Section 5H1.10 reiterates that race, sex, national origin,
creed, religion, and socioeconomic status are "not relevant in determination of a sentence." Id. at
326. Amendments added as §§ 5H1.11 and 5H1.12 are discussed in text accompanying notes 88-95.
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1993] CHILDHOOD ABUSE 1339
within a guideline range or for conditions of supervised release or
probation. 9
Policy statement 5K2.0, although not binding as a guideline,40 pre-
serves a court's ability to depart by incorporating the "aggravating or
mitigating circumstance" provision of Section 3553(b). 41 How narrowly
courts interpret this provision and other guideline commentary pertain-
ing to departures bears directly on a judge's willingness to impose a
sentence outside a designated sentencing range.42 The introduction to
the first chapter of the Guidelines Manual sheds some light on what
role the Commission intended departures to play in the sentencing
scheme.'3
III. DEPARTURES UNDER THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
A. Types of Departures
The introduction to Chapter One of the Guidelines Manual identi-
fies two types of departures from the sentencing structure: guided and
unguided.," Guided departures are predetermined increases or de-
creases in a defendant's sentencing level that are suggested by the Com-
mission in the absence or presence of certain factors.43 Therefore,
district court judges have true discretion in unguided departures only
because the Commission makes no formal recommendation as to adjust-
ments in sentencing levels.4' However, the Commission has designated
certain factors as appropriate or inappropriate grounds for unguided
departures. 7
The first type of unguided departure, governed by Section 5K1.1, is
a downward departure based on the defendant's cooperation with au-
thorities. 4' The 5K1.1 departure requires a government motion, al-
39. Id. at ch. 5, Pt. H, intro, comment. at 323.
40. See notes 69-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the distinction between guide-
lines and policy statements.
41. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, p.s. at 330 (cited in note 12).
42. See note 103 and accompanying text.
43. See U.S.S.G. ch. 1., Pt. A, intro, comment. at 1-10 (cited in note 12).
44. Id. at 5-6.
45. Id. An example of a guided departure is found in the commentary accompanying
U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1 at 133 ("Transportation for the Purpose of Prostitution or Prohibited Sexual
Conduct"). An eight-level downward departure is recommended if no commercial purpose was in-
volved. Id.
46. Id.
47. See generally U.S.S.G. ch. 5, Pts. H & K at 323-36. For a discussion of these factors, see
text accompanying notes 37-41.
48. See id. § 5K1.1 at 329 (providing that "[u]pon motion of the government stating that the
defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person
who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines").
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though an amendment has been proposed to allow sentencing courts to
initiate the departure in special situations.
4 9
The second type of unguided departure is the judicial discretionary
departure, which occurs when a sentencing court finds an "aggravating
or mitigating circumstance" that calls for a sentence either above (up-
ward departure) or below (downward departure) the applicable guide-
line range.50 In order to justify a departure, the circumstance must be
one that the Commission did not adequately consider in promulgating
the guidelines. 1 Several circuits, including the Ninth, articulate the
rule as follows: if the Commission considered a factor in formulating the
guidelines, a sentencing court can depart only in "extraordinary circum-
stances."52 In determining whether a particular factor was adequately
considered, the Commission instructs the circuit courts to consider only
the guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary.5 3 For pur-
poses of appellate review, judges must explicitly state their reasons for
imposing a sentence outside a specified range.
54
B. Appellate Review of Departures
Judicial discretionary departures are subject to appellate review for
reasonableness.5 The Ninth Circuit applies a three-part test similar to
that used in other circuits.5" First, the court reviews de novo whether
the district judge identified an aggravating or mitigating circumstance
of a kind or to a degree that the Commission did not adequately con-
49. See 57 Fed. Reg. 62848 (1992) (proposed Dec. 31, 1992) (inviting comment on a proposed
amendment that would authorize courts, in cases in which mandatory minimum sentencing stat-
utes are not applicable, to depart if they find that the defendant substantially assisted authorities,
regardless of whether the government makes such a motion).
50. See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 at 330 (cited in note 12). Also significant is the statement in
§ 5K2.0 that "[tihe controlling decision as to whether and to what extent departure is warranted
can only be made by the courts." Id.
51. Id.
52. See United States v. Roe, 976 F.2d 1216, 1218 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing United States v.
Boshell, 952 F.2d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that if a factor was taken into consideration
in structuring the guidelines, it will not support a departure unless extraordinary circumstances
exist)).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (cited in note 13). Professor Freed notes the significance of the word
"adequately" in § 3553(b). He states that "the statute did not make mere Commission 'considera-
tion' the test of guideline legitimacy and enforceability .... [T]he Commission's mention of a
factor in a sentencing guideline, policy statement, or official commentary would [not] be sufficient
to bind a district court." Freed, 101 Yale L. J. at 1733-34 (cited in note 14).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c).
55. Id. § 3742(e)(3).
56. See United States v. Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d 745, 746 (9th Cir. 1991). For a detailed
analysis of the review processes in the various circuits, see Thomas W. Hutchinson and David
Yellen, Federal Sentencing Law and Practice § 9.4 (West, 1989 & Supp. 1991) (noting that the
approaches used by the Seventh and Second Circuits are more deferential to the guidelines).
1340
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sider when drafting the guidelines.57 Second, the court reviews, for clear
error, findings of fact supporting the presence of the aggravating or mit-
igating circumstance.58 Last, the court determines whether the degree of
departure was reasonable or an abuse of discretion.59
Some circuits routinely remand or reverse departures in which dis-
trict courts have relied on the defendant's background characteristics. 0
Perhaps this occurs because appellate judges do not face the offender
when reviewing a case and therefore find it easier to detach themselves
from humanistic considerations; as a result, appellate judges are more
willing to enforce the Commission's restrictive policy statements." In
contrast, the Ninth Circuit is moving toward a policy of greater defer-
ence to the trial court and less deference to the Commission's policy
statements in departure cases that are based on offender characteris-
tics.6 2 Many circuits, however, still construe policy statements strictly.6 3
C. Judicial Restraints on Discretionary Departures
The primary restraints on discretionary departures are the policy
statements in Section 5H, which label offender characteristics either
"not ordinarily relevant" to departure decisions or "not relevant" at
57. Lira-Barazza, 941 F.2d at 746.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 747.
60. See Karle and Sager, 40 Emory L. J. at 431 (cited in note 21) (noting that "[i]he First,
Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have rejected downward departures based upon offender char-
acteristics"). More specifically, see United States v. Pozzy, 902 F.2d 133 (1st Cir. 1990) (overturn-
ing departure based on pregnancy of the defendant and other factors); United States v. Harpst,
949 F.2d 860 (6th Cir. 1991) (overturning departure based on the defendant's suicidal tendency);
United States v. Frazier, 979 F.2d 1227 (7th Cir. 1992) (overturning departure based on failure to
establish a connection between diminished mental capacity and the commission of the offense).
See also note 132 and accompanying text for a discussion of United States v. Daly, 883 F.2d 313
(4th Cir. 1989).
61. See generally Freed, 101 Yale L. J. at 1698-1700 (cited in note 14) (discussing the ten-
dency of appellate courts to narrow the discretion of district courts through restrictive review
standards).
62. Consider United States v. Cook, 938 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1991), appeal after remand, 988
F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1993) (endorsing the complex of factors approach discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 168-70); United States v. Floyd, 945 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on different
grounds by United States v. Atkinson, 990 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1993) (departing based on lack of
guidance as a youth); Roe, 976 F.2d at 1216 (recommending departure based on childhood abuse).
More recently, see United States v. Valdez-Gonzalez, 957 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming
downward departure based on the defendant's relative lack of culpability and socioeconomic sta-
tus); United States v. Crippen, 961 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming that a finding of reduced
culpability based on a defendant's history and characteristics may constitute grounds for a down-
ward departure).
63. See note 60.
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all."4 The Commission's recent amendment to Section 5H, effective No-
vember 1, 1992, is a policy statement declaring that youthful lack of
guidance and other similar circumstances evidencing a disadvantaged
upbringing belong in that category of factors deemed "not relevant"
grounds for departure from the guidelines. 5 The other factors previ-
ously labeled "not relevant" include race, creed, sex, socioeconomic sta-
tus, national origin, religion, alcohol or other drug dependence, and
financial difficulties.66 Those circumstances warranting the more lenient
classification of "not ordinarily relevant" include the following: educa-
tion and vocational skills; age and physical condition; mental and emo-
tional conditions; employment history; family and community ties and
responsibilities; civic, military, public, or charitable service; and contri-
butions related to employment or prior similar good works.6 '
In determining the possible impact of Amendment 5H1.12 on abuse
cases, several questions are crucial. First, how does a policy statement
differ from a guideline, and what degree of deference should be ac-
corded to each? Second, did the Commission intend similar circum-
stances evidencing a disadvantaged upbringing s to encompass
childhood abuse, or was the Commission primarily concerned with elim-
inating Floyd-type departures based on youthful lack of guidance?
Third, what are.the grounds for the distinction between those factors
that are not ordinarily relevant and those that are never relevant? Last,
assuming that the Commission did intend to exclude abuse along with
youthful lack of guidance as possible grounds for departure, was the
Commission justified in its decision?
IV. THE POLICY STATEMENT
A. Policy Statements as Nonbinding Authority
Many courts regard the guidelines and policy statements as equally
binding; however, commentators Daniel Freed and Marc Miller suggest
that Congress intended policy statements to be purely advisory and not
binding on sentencing courts.6 In support of their arguments, the au-
thors note that Congress did not afford policy statements the same pre-
64. U.S.S.G. §§ 5H1.1-.12, p.s. at 323-26 (cited in note 12). For the Commission's policy
statements as to valid grounds for upward and downward departures, see id. §§ 5K1.1-2.16 at 329-
35.
65. Id. § 5H1.12 at 326.
66. Id. §§ 5H1.4 at 324, 5H1.1 at 326, 5K2.12 at 326.
67. Id. §§ 5H1.1-.6 at 325, 5H1.11 at 326.
68. Id. § 5H1.12 at 326.
69. See Marc Miller and Daniel J. Freed, Offender Characteristics and Vulnerable Victims:
The Difference Between Policy Statements and Guidelines, 3 Fed. Sent. Rptr. 3, 3 (1990).
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sumption of validity as the guidelines. For example, no statutory
provision requires review of a proposed policy statement before it be-
comes effective, nor is an appellate review required when a policy state-
ment is violated.70 Additionally, the absence of explanations or studies
in support of most policy statements is more reason to question their
authority.
71
Despite this evidence that Congress did not intend for policy state-
ments to bind sentencing courts, many judges continue to treat them as
guidelines. 2 Moreover, in the recent decision Williams v. United
States, 73 a majority of the Supreme Court afforded considerable weight
to a policy statement and ignored the dissenters' argument that Con-
gress intended to differentiate between policy statements and guide-
lines. 4 Because policy statements do command deference, warranted or
not, the promulgation of new policy statements has been the Commis-
sion's most effective weapon against judicial discretionary departures.
7 15
B. The Amendment: The Commission's Best Weapon
The Sentencing Commission is authorized to submit guideline
amendments and modifications to Congress for annual approval.7 6 After
a period of review, these changes become effective unless Congress mod-
ifies or disapproves of them.77 Prior to submitting these changes, how-
ever, the Commission is required to consult with authorities such as the
Judicial Conference of the United States, the Bureau of Prisons, and
the Criminal Division of the Justice Department.7 8 Section 994(o) re-
quires these and other authorities to submit annual reports to the Com-
mission, suggesting warranted guideline changes and generally assessing
the guidelines' effectiveness and the Commission's work. 9 However, the
Commission is not required to include these suggested changes in its
proposal to Congress.8 0
70. Id. at 4.
71. See id. See also Marc Miller and Daniel J. Freed, Editor's Observations: Amending the
Guidelines, 4 Fed. Sent. Rptr. 307 (1992).
72. See Miller and Freed, 3 Fed. Sent. Rptr. at 4 (cited in note 69).
73. 112 S. Ct. 1112 (1992).
74. Id. at 1125. Justice White noted that "Congress has clearly distinguished between guide-
lines and policy statements." Id. (White, J., dissenting).
75. See notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 994 (p) (cited in note 20).
77. See id.
78. Id. § 994(o).
79. Id.
80. See id. The statute requires only that "[t]he Commission periodically . . . review and
revise, in consideration of comments and data coming to its attention, the guidelines promulgated
pursuant to this section." Id.
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Freed and Miller suggest that the Commission drafted restrictive
policy statements with the intent of soliciting feedback from judges be-
cause it did not have time, when originally promulgating the guidelines,
to consider adequately all potentially relevant offender characteristics
in sentencing.81 Through the reports of authorities such as the Judicial
Conference, the Commission could consider this feedback when promul-
gating future amendments to the guidelines.82
Although judges throughout the federal system have provided valu-
able feedback, the Commission has largely ignored it, particularly sug-
gestions that the Commission take a more flexible approach in
considering offender characteristics during sentencing.83 The Commis-
sion has not only ignored this request, but it has further restricted the
scope of discretionary departures by attacking those offender character-
istics that judges have relied on in specific cases.84
For example, in the 1990 decision United States v. Lara,85 the Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed a downward departure based on the defendant's
delicate physique and his potential vulnerability in prison." The Com-
mission responded with the November 1991 amendment to Section
5H1.4, declaring that physical appearance, including physique, is not
ordinarily relevant as a consideration for departure.8 7 That same year,
the Commission added Section 5H1.11 in response to two cases: United
States v. Big Crow, 8 in which the Eighth Circuit affirmed a downward
departure based on the defendant's impeccable employment history
and his continuous efforts to overcome the adverse conditions of an
American Indian reservation,89 and United States v. Pipich,0 a District
of Maryland case in which the court based a downward departure on
the defendant's military service.91 The 5H1.11 amendment announced
that military, charitable, civic, or public service; work-related contribu-
81. Miller and Freed, 3 Fed. Sent. Rptr. at 4-5 (cited in note 69).
82. Id.
83. See Paul J. Hofer, Commission Sends 31 Amendments to Congress, 4 Fed. Sent. Rptr.
310 (1992) (noting the Judicial Conference's "special concern [with] the lack of flexibility on the
part of judges to individualize sentences under the guidelines").
84. See Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge's Reflections on Departures from the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 5 Fed. Sent. Rptr. 6, 8-9 (1992) (noting that "[tihe Sentencing Commission
seems determined to root out any deviation from harsh punishment").
85. 905 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1990).
86. Id. at 605.
87. See U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4, p.s. at 324 (cited in note 12). See also Weinstein, 5 Fed. Sent.
Rptr. at 9 (cited in note 84).
88. 898 F.2d 1326 (8th Cir. 1990).
89. Id. at 1332.
90. 688 F. Supp. 191 (D. Md. 1988).
91. Id. at 192.
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tions; and other prior good deeds are not ordinarily relevant in consid-
ering whether a departure from the guidelines is warranted.92
The most recent links in the amendments to departures chain are
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Floyd"' and the November 1992 amend-
ment prohibiting consideration of lack of guidance and similar factors.""
The 5H1.12 amendment, however, differs from other amendments in
one important aspect: it identifies lack of guidance and other considera-
tions stemming from a disadvantaged youth as belonging to that class
of factors that can never be relevant to a departure decision.
5
C. "Not Relevant" Versus "Not Ordinarily Relevant"
Congress's main goal in creating the Sentencing Commission was to
achieve equality in sentencing by preventing courts from considering
irrelevant factors such as race, sex, and economic class.98 In promulgat-
ing the guidelines and amendments, however, the Commission has used
language that often discourages consideration of factors that are rele-
vant to the sentencing decision, such as the defendant's personal
97
In the introductory chapter to the guidelines, the Commission ex-
pressed its intent that the courts treat a guideline as having carved out
a heartland, a group of typical cases dealing with the particular type of
conduct described in the guideline.9 8 A departure may be warranted,
however, in an atypical case, in which a guideline applies but the de-
fendant's conduct is significantly different from the norm.9  The Coim-
mission then excepts those factors labeled in Section 5H and 5K as
"not relevant" and declares that such considerations cannot be grounds
for departure. 100 Apart from these exceptions, the Commission concedes
that any other factor, whether addressed in the guidelines or not, may
serve as a basis for departure in unusual cases.10 1 Therefore, unlike the
"not relevant" factors, those considerations listed as "not ordinarily rel-
92. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.11, p.s. at 326. See also Weinstein, 5 Fed. Sent. Rptr. at 9 (cited in note
84).
93. Floyd, 945 F.2d 1096.
94. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.12, p.s. at 326 (cited in note 12).
95. Id.
96. See notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
97. See notes 102, 103, and accompanying text.
98. U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A 4(b), intro. comment. at 5-6 (cited in note 12).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. This commentary specifically states that except for the few factors declared not rele-
vant, "the Commission does not intend to limit the kinds of factors, whether or not mentioned
anywhere else in the guidelines, that could constitute grounds for departure in an unusual case."
Id. at 6. "Lack of [g]uidance as a [y]outh and [s]imilar [c]ircumstances" is specifically enumerated
here as not relevant, a result of the 1992 amendment. Id.
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evant" in Section 5H may be valid grounds for departure in unusual
situations. 102 Many judges, however, hesitate to depart, even in unusual
cases, if a factor has been labeled "not ordinarily relevant," either for
fear of reversal on appeal or because the Commission adequately con-
sidered the factor in formulating the guidlelines. 10 The end result is
that the Sentencing Commission has thwarted judicial discretion be-
yond the level intended by Congress.
The latest addition to the Commission's blacklist of irrelevant fac-
tors is especially disturbing: an outright attempt to ban the considera-
tion of a defendant's family background. 04 The Commission offers no
explanation or commentary in support of its conclusion that lack of
guidance as a youth or a disadvantaged upbringing is completely irrele-
vant for sentencing purposes, and it fails to delineate the scope of the
amendment. 10 5 Because of this ambiguity, sentencing courts are likely
to regard a defendant's history of childhood abuse as a similar circum-
stance indicating a disadvantaged upbringing, 10 and refuse to consider
it as possible grounds for departure even in extreme cases. However, an
alternative, more flexible approach for determining the relevance of
childhood abuse in criminal sentencing has emerged: the Ninth Circuit
method in Roe.10 7 Hopefully this approach will prevail.
V. UNITED STATES V. ROE
B. Roe' 08 pled guilty to bank robbery in the United States District
Court for the District of Oregon and received a sentence of 145 months
in prison. 0 9 Roe appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals claim-
ing that the lower court erred when it declined to grant a downward
departure based on her childhood history of abuse." 0 The record shows
that until the age of twelve, Roe lived with her mother, a drug addict,
and her mother's boyfriend, a drug dealer."' For several years, often
daily, the mother's boyfriend brutally beat Roe with coat hangers, ex-
102. See id.
103. See United States v. Roe, 976 F.2d 1216, 1217 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting the district court's
reluctance to classify Roe's exceptional history of abuse as extraordinary). See also United States
v. Dillard. 975 F.2d 1554, 1555 (8th Cir. 1992) (concluding that because the Commission "ade-
quately considered" diminished mental capacity in formulating Section 5K2.13, a court is fore-
closed from considering that factor under 5K2.0).
104. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.12, p.s. at 326 (cited in note 12).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
108. This case was initially filed under the plaintiff's full name; however, the court decided to
change that name to "B. Roe" for purposes of publication. Roe, 976 F.2d at 1216.
109. Id. at 1217.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1218.
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tension cords, and belts; Roe also was raped and sodomized repeat-
edly.112 At least once, the boyfriend urinated in Roe's mouth while
forcing her to lie naked.1 3 After Roe ran away from home at age twelve,
an acquaintance took her to Las Vegas and forced her to become a
prostitute, during which period Roe was repeatedly abused by pimps
and customers.1 14 Roe suffered similar patterns of abuse until the time
she committed the robbery over fifteen years later.116
The district court held that the effects of childhood abuse are cov-
ered under Section 5H1.3, the Commission's policy statement pertain-
ing to mental and emotional conditions.1 6 Because the Commission
concluded that such conditions are "not ordinarily relevant" grounds
for departure, the district court stated that it could grant a departure
based on a defendant's abusive history in "extraordinary circum-
stances" only;117 the court held that such circumstances did not exist in
Roe's case."1 "
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court's ruling that Sec-
tion 5H1.3 encompasses the effects of abuse,1 9 and therefore such a
finding may constitute grounds for departure in extraordinary circum-
stances only.12 0 The Ninth Circuit, however, held that the lower court
clearly erred in concluding that Roe's circumstances were not extraordi-
nary; the court pointed to expert medical testimony showing that Roe's
abusive history greatly exceeded that of typical abuse cases, and that,
as a result, she had become "virtually a mindless puppet. 1 21 The Ninth
Circuit remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration of
Roe's exceptional circumstances. 22
The Ninth Circuit opinion implied that the savage abuse Roe suf-
fered affected her state of mind, thus reducing her culpability. 23 The





116. Id. at 1217-18.
117. Id. at 1217 (citing United States v. Boshell, 952 F.2d 1107, 1107 (9th Cir. 1991)).
118. Id.
119. The court noted that the Fifth and Eighth Circuits also support the proposition that the
effects of abuse are encompassed under Section 5H1.3. Id.
120. Id. at 1218.
121. Id.
122. Id. The Ninth Circuit also suggested that on remand the district court should consider
"whether Roe's history of abuse and neglect warrants a departure under ... Floyd." Id. Note that
Roe was decided approximately one month prior to the effective date of Amendment 5H1.12. See
note 158 and accompanying text.
123. Roe, 976 F.2d at 1217-18.
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sentencing. 124 In the pre-guideline era, sentencing judges routinely con-
sidered mental competency, education, age, criminal record, and other
factors in calculating the degree of a defendant's blameworthiness. 125
Despite policy statements discouraging consideration of many of these
factors, Roe represents the proposition that culpability should remain a
central principle in federal sentencing. The Ninth Circuit justified its
focus on culpability in United States v. Crippen2 6 by asserting that
although Congress did not define "aggravating or mitigating circum-
stance" for purposes of Section 3553(b), those words suggest that such a
circumstance is a proper basis for departure only if it relates to the
defendant's culpability, the seriousness of the crime, or other sentenc-
ing concerns authorized by Congress. 2 7 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit
has continued to adhere to its pre-guidelines principle that a sentencing
judge must personally assess the culpability of individual defendants
rather than mechanically apply a prescribed sentence to a given cate-
gory of crime. 2 '
In the wake of Amendment 5H1.12, the questions arise of whether
courts should treat childhood abuse as manifesting a mental or emo-
tional condition under 5H1.3, preserving a court's right to depart in ex-
treme cases, or as a circumstance indicating a disadvantaged upbringing
under 5H1.12, thus refusing to consider it as grounds for departure,
even in extreme cases such as Roe. Freed and Miller's argument that no
policy statement is binding on the courts would solve this problem; 29
however, most courts, including the Supreme Court,130 have not em-
braced this idea and continue to afford considerable deference to the
policy statements.' 3 ' Therefore, the question remains: Is a defendant's
124. See Miller and Freed, 3 Fed. Sent. Rptr. at 5-6 (cited in note 69) (noting that the
blameworthiness of the defendant historically has been an "integral component[] of just
sentencing").
125. Id.
126. 961 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1992).
127. Id. at 884.
128. See United States v. Floyd, 945 F.2d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on different
grounds by United States v. Atkinson, 990 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing the Barker/Brady
principle as first enunciated in United States v. Barker, 771 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1985), a pre-
guidelines case, later held as valid in the post-guidelines case United States v. Brady, 895 F.2d 538
(9th Cir. 1990)).
129. See note 69 and accompanying text.
130. See note 73 and accompanying text for a discussion of Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1112. See
also Dillard, 975 F.2d at 1555 (holding that because "the Sentencing Commission adequately con-
sidered the circumstances for downward departure based on diminished mental capacity when it
formulated section 5K2.13, [the court was] foreclos[ed from] consideration of diminished mental
capacity under section 5K2.0").
131. Policy statements such as § 5H1.12 that declare certain factors "not relevant" are even
less likely to be challenged in court than those labeled "not ordinarily relevant." See generally
U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1-.12 at 326 (cited in note 12).
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history of abuse per se an improper consideration? Or should the abuse
be considered grounds for departure in extraordinary or atypical cases?
A. Treatment of Childhood Abuse in Other Circuits
The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Daly"3 2 refused to depart
downward based on the defendant's history of childhood abuse, stating
that criminal conduct too often can be traced to such factors.1 33 Such
courts believe that if these kinds of departures are allowed, the criminal
justice system will be flooded with defendants fighting to establish the
connection between childhood abuse and criminal conduct.134 The Daly
floodgates argument'35 fails to recognize that weeding out meritless
claims and defenses is an essential function of the judicial system. The
relevance of a defendant's history of abuse should depend on the quan-
tity and severity of the abuse endured and whether the effects of the
abuse bear on the defendant's culpability. Certainly, if a defendant's
history is indistinguishable from that of innumerable other defendants,
no departure is warranted. In cases such as Roe, however, in which a
defendant's mental and emotional state has deteriorated as a result of
over fifteen years of continuous physical and sexual abuse,1 6 a sentenc-
ing court should be free to depart based on a finding of reduced
culpability.
The Fifth Circuit, like the Ninth, analyzes the effects of childhood
abuse as a mental and emotional condition covered under policy state-
ment 5H1.3.137 In addition to the "extraordinary circumstances" re-
quirement, however, the Fifth Circuit requires a direct causal
connection between the abuse and the present offense. ss For example,
in United States v. Vela,"'3 the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that a his-
tory of incest could be grounds for departure in an extraordinary case
but affirmed the district court's refusal to depart downward even
though the defendant suffered childhood sexual abuse that admittedly
was "shocking and repulsive."' 40 The court held that this downward de-
132. 883 F.2d 313 (4th Cir. 1989).
133. Id. at 319. The court noted that "current criminal behavior can often be partially ex-
plained by childhood abuse and neglect" and that "these are [not] the kinds of considerations
which warrant substantial reductions in guidelines sentences." Id.
134. See id.
135. See id. The court refers to the "innumerable defendants" that could plead "unstable
upbringing" as a ground for departure.
136. See notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
137. See United States v. Vela, 927 F.2d 197, 199 (5th Cir. 1991).
138. See id. at 199-200.
139. Vela, 927 F.2d 197.
140. Id. at 199.
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parture was unjustified because the evidence failed to show that the
defendant's unfortunate history caused her to commit the offense. 141
A noticeable distinction arises between Roe and Vela. In Roe, the
defendant claimed that a male companion coerced her into committing
the robbery by threatening and striking her prior to the incident. 4 ' Ad-
ditionally, medical experts testified that the defendant's exceptional
history of abuse rendered her nothing more than a mindless instrument
in the perpetration of the crime. 43 The defendant in Vela offered no
similar testimony; rather, the court found that the defendant freely
chose to participate in a heroin conspiracy. 4 4 Although reaching differ-
ent results, both of these cases appear to rest on the same principle: to
warrant a downward departure, the effects of abuse must manifest
themselves in such a way as to impair the volition of the defendant.
Just as the Ninth and Fifth Circuits treat the effects of childhood
abuse as a potential mental or emotional condition under 5H1.3, the
Eighth Circuit treats the effects of spousal abuse similarly. In United
States v. Desormeaux,4 5 the Eighth Circuit stated that although
spousal abuse is "not ordinarily relevant" in departure decisions, it nev-
ertheless may warrant a departure in unusual circumstances."4 The
court, however, held that the circumstances in Desormeaux did not
meet that test, reversing the lower court's decision to depart from the
guidelines."47 In support of this holding, the court maintained that the
abuse was too attenuated to support a departure."48 For example, the
defendant had never married but claimed to have been involved with a
man who emotionally and physically abused her."9 Further, the abuse
had occurred three years prior to the assault for which the defendant
was charged, and the victim had no relation to the prior abuse. 50 Fi-
nally, the court held that the defendant's diminished self-esteem and
self-worth were not significant enough to justify departure.' 5'
Desormeaux presents yet another issue: what weight should sen-
tencing courts give to the amount of time that passes between the abuse
and the commission of the crime? Although the Roe and Vela courts
did not address the significance of a lapse of time between the abuse
141. Id. at 200.
142. Roe, 976 F.2d at 1219.
143. Id. at 1218.
144. See Vela, 927 F.2d at 199.
145. 952 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1991).
146. Id. at 185.
147. Id. at 185, 187.






and the crime, this temporal factor could bear on culpability and causa-
tion. In Roe the record showed that the defendant had been abused for
the past fifteen years, apparently until the time of the trial.152 In Vela,
however, the abuse apparently was confined to the defendant's child-
hood, several years prior to the conviction. 153
Although the Roe court focused on the defendant's state of mind
and her reduced culpability, the continual abuse Roe suffered until the
time of the offense likely influenced the outcome of the case. Under the
Roe approach, however, a temporal lapse would not necessarily defeat a
departure. By contrast, such a lapse likely would prevent a departure
under the Vela analysis because temporal proximity bears directly on
causation; the more time that passes between the abuse and the crime,
the less likely it becomes that the former trauma caused the latter
behavior.
One final factor appears in Desormeaux that is not present in Roe
or Vela: the victim of the crime was not involved in prior abusive inci-
dents. 54 Although the identity of the defendant's abuser is not relevant
to a departure based on a mental or emotional condition under 5H1.3,
it is relevant to policy statement 5K2.10, which allows departures from
a guideline range if the victim's misconduct provoked the defendant
into acting violently. 55 This policy statement, however, does not apply
to a defendant who is charged with criminal sexual abuse or a nonvio-
lent crime.15 6
In summary, defendants may receive some protection from the in-
flexible guideline system under 5K2.10 when their crimes are directed
at their abusers. Victims of abuse whose crimes are not related to their
abusers may seek a departure in those circuits relying on 5H1.3, pro-
vided extraordinary circumstances exist. Depending upon the judicial
reception of policy statement 5H1.12, however, departures may become
unavailable even in these circuits.
B. The 1992 Amendments
Policy statement 5H1.12, effective November 1, 1992, states that
youthful lack of guidance and similar circumstances evidencing a disad-
vantaged upbringing are not relevant grounds for a downward depar-
152. See United States v. Roe, 976 F.2d 1216, 1218 (9th Cir. 1992).
153. See text accompanying notes 137-41.
154. See Desormeaux, 952 F.2d at 185.
155. See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.10, p.s. at 333 (cited in note 12) (stating that "[i]f the victim's
wrongful conduct contributed significantly to provoking the offense behavior, the court may reduce




ture from the applicable guideline range. 157 The history of the
amendment indicates that 5H1.12 was not proposed in its current form;
rather, the Commission initially requested comment on whether the
policy statements should be amended to provide expressly whether a
court may consider a defendant's lack of guidance as a youth, a history
of family violence, or similar factors as grounds for departure. 5 Signifi-
cantly, the policy statement in its final form does not mention "history
of family violence;" instead, it substitutes the vague notion of "similar
circumstances indicating a disadvantaged upbringing. '15 Although the
Commission may have intended the latter clause to be all-encompass-
ing, a more rational explanation is that after evaluating the issue of
family violence, the Commission was not comfortable expressly preclud-
ing consideration of a defendant's abusive history.
Further support for the proposition that 5H1.12 does not cover
family violence is the Commission's prompt proposal of the amendment
in response to Floyd,'60 because of the case's "lack of youthful guid-
ance" standard, which was regarded as dangerously vague."' By con-
trast, a defendant's abusive upbringing is a palpable reality; the effects
of such abuse are more easily gauged and are usually much more severe.
Therefore, a defendant's documented history of childhood abuse does
not deserve the same treatment as the nebulous lack of youthful guid-
ance standard.
Declaring that a defendant's past suffering can never be relevant to
a sentencing decision ignores the reality that judges sentence individu-
als, not fact patterns, and that they consider many factors when evalu-
ating a defendant's culpability. 62 Alternatively, some circuits now skirt
restrictive policy statements by recognizing that sentencing necessarily
involves evaluation of a multitude of offender characteristics and their
interactions with each other.163 In 1992, the Commission, on behalf of
157. Id. at § 5H1.12, p.s. at 326.
158. 57 Fed. Reg. 112 (1992) (proposed Jan. 2, 1992).
159. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.12, p.s. at 326 (cited in note 12).
160. See Miller and Freed, 4 Fed. Sent. Rptr. at 307 (cited in note 71) (noting that although
the Commission directly attacked the "lack of youthful guidance standard," it did so without spe-
cifically mentioning Floyd or otherwise explaining its conclusion).
161. See Judicial Conference Testimony, 4 Fed. Sent. Rptr. 319, 324 (1992) (quoting State-
ment of Vincent L. Broderick, Chair, Comm. on Criminal Law of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, and Mark L. Wolf, Chair, Subcomm. on Sentencing Guidelines and Procedures
before the United States Sentencing Commission, as remarking that "[a]mbiguous standards such
as 'lack of youthful guidance' . . . are likely to make the sentencing hearing a battleground over
discrete factors that are poorly defined").
162. See id. at 320 (stating that "[tihe Commission provides Guidelines for a statistical uni-
verse: each time a judge sentences there is not only a factual pattern before him but there is an
individual, different from every other individual in the world").
163. See note 167 and accompanying text.
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the Judicial Conference, considered a second amendment reflecting this
alternative view, but the amendment failed in Congress."" This amend-
ment proposed adding the following paragraph to the Introductory
Commentary of Chapter 5, Part H:
Offender characteristics that are not ordinarily relevant to determining whether a
sentence should be outside the guidelines, or where within the guidelines a sentence
should fall, may be relevant to a departure from the guidelines if such factors,
alone or in combination, are present to an unusual degree and are important to the
sentencing purposes in the particular case.16'
The amendment was part of an overall plea with the Commission to
eliminate guideline language discouraging departures, because judges
perceive the discretion to depart from the guidelines to be an integral
part of an effective guidelines system.1 6 The Commission designed this
particular addition to encourage judges to consider offender characteris-
tics that are present in abnormal degrees or unique combinations, and
to depart if necessary to further the sentencing purpose. 1
7
The Commission is considering a revised but essentially identical
amendment in 1993,168 attempting again to resolve the question of
whether a court may treat a conglomeration of factors as a mitigating
circumstance warranting departure or whether individual circumstances
must be weighed separately. Meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit continues to
use the "combination of factors" approach it enunciated in United
States v. Cook." 9 In Cook, the court stated that the reference in Title
18 U.S.C. Section 3553(b) to a "mitigating circumstance" in the singu-
lar is not a rational reason for holding that this circumstance cannot be
comprised of a "combination of factors. 17 0 Moreover, the court stressed
that to reach a wise decision, the court must consider total behaviorial
patterns and how particular factors interact.
71
The "complex of factors" approach to sentencing departures en-
sures that certain circumstances, such as a defendant's violent family
164. See 57 Fed. Reg. 112 (1992) (proposed Jan. 2, 1992).
165. Id. (emphasis added).
166. See generally Judicial Conference Testimony, 4 Fed. Sent. Rptr. at 320-29 (cited in
note 161).
167. See id. at 324.
168. See 57 Fed. Reg. 62848 (1992) (proposed Dec. 31, 1992) (inserting the following addi-
tional paragraph in the Introductory Commentary to § 5H1.1: "Offender characteristics that are
not ordinarily relevant to determining whether a sentence should be outside the guidelines may be
considered if such factors, alone or in combination, are present to an unusual degree and are im-
portant to the sentencing purpose in the particular case"). The Commission also invited comment
on "whether the language in Chapter One, Part A 4(b) (departures) can be read as overly restric-
tive of a court's ability to depart and, if so, how this language might be amended." Id.
169. 938 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1991).




history, receive consideration when warranted. As a result of policy
statement 5H1.12, however, courts now may refuse to consider this fac-
tor even in combination with others.
VI. CONCLUSION
Until the Commission chooses to address directly the relevance of a
defendant's history of family violence in federal sentencing, courts must
decide for themselves whether to apply the extraordinary circumstances
test under 5H1.3 or to refuse consideration of the abuse under 5H1.12.
The proposed 1993 amendments contain no reference to either policy
statement or to departures based on a history of family violence; how-
ever, a complete examination of departure jurisprudence is scheduled
for the 1994 amendment cycle.
Apart from deciding the scope of new and existing policy state-
ments, courts retain the power to challenge all policy statements as
nonbinding authority. However, in light of the significant weight the
Supreme Court recently afforded a policy statement in Williams, these
challenges are less likely now, particularly challenges to policy state-
ments declaring a factor "not relevant." Therefore, to preserve the dis-
cretion to depart based on a defendant's history of abuse, judges should
follow Roe and weigh the effects of abuse on a defendant's mental or
emotional condition under 5H1.3.
Retaining judicial discretion to depart from the sentencing struc-
ture in severe cases of abuse furthers the congressional purpose behind
the Sentencing Reform Act: to provide guidelines that promote uni-
formity in sentencing but remain sufficiently flexible to account for ag-
gravating or mitigating circumstances. Through their voice in the
Judicial Conference, sentencing judges should urge the Commission to
endorse the Roe approach in future amendments to the guidelines. The
alternative-for judges to interpret 5H1.12 as prohibiting consideration
of the effects of abuse-would further narrow the scope of judicial dis-
cretion and prevent accurate assessments of criminal culpability, an es-
sential function of an equitable system of justice.*
Jean H. Shuttleworth
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